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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #6313-79/1

23 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 20 November with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.


William Parmenter

Attachment
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NFAC #6313-79

21 November 1979

WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 13

USSR, CUBA, ET AL.

Our discussion of Soviet and Cuban policy concluded that its main thrust at present is to keep the Soviet hand in, both in southern Africa and in the Horn. By their actions, the Soviets in southern Africa are clearly telling us that a settlement coming out of Lancaster House does not in any way mean they are leaving; on the contrary, they are already moving, via advice and guidance to the Patriotic Front elements, toward the next phase of acquiring influence over a black government in Zimbabwe or countering strongly the influence of the West or South Africa. This argues that we should be prepared to see Soviet/Cuban activity take other forms -- political action, reconstruction advice, for example -- in the coming months.

In the Horn, we believe that the latest indications of movement by Cuban personnel are a rotation rather than a withdrawal. There is also evidence that the Soviets, via advisors, may play a somewhat larger role in the next Ethiopian offensive against the Eritreans, probably to try to ensure more effective operations. This suggests a continued gradual growth of Soviet influence, at the same time that there are signs of further deterioration in US-Ethiopian relations.

Concern was also expressed over the potential for some expansion of Soviet/Cuban relationships with the major islands in the Indian Ocean -- Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar. An acute case of paranoia is afflicting the leadership in Seychelles -- while President Rene has obtained Tanzanians to form a praetorian guard, we still think he is capable of asking for Cubans should he become even more worried. The problems of Mauritius are longer term, but we note that that bird of evil omen, the International Monetary Fund, has arrived to give what is likely to be its usual politically difficult advice, while the island's social problems are unimproved. Analysts noting the continuing flow of Soviet military equipment to Madagascar wonder how the Malagasy government intends to repay; naval and air facilities are about the only assets the country has that can be traded

* *This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.*

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for such imports. The role that the Indian Ocean seems likely to play in US strategic thinking re the Middle East gives greater weight to this kind of worry.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Looking ahead toward the next two to three months, the focus of analysts' concern is the possibility of South African intervention in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The South Africans appear beset with uncertainties and searching for an outcome that is at least not openly hostile to their interests. If the Rhodesian situation collapses, we would of course expect them to intervene directly in some way, but there are differences among the analysts as to how far the South Africans would go. Some believe they would use virtually all available means to prevent an "extremist" like Mugabe from taking over, even if he were elected. Others think more cautious counsels would prevail and that the South Africans would feel they could learn to live with even a relatively radical leadership, provided this did not immediately produce a mass exodus of whites.

There are also differences of view over how the pre-election period in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia will go. DIA analysts tend to be pessimistic, thinking the situation may be so bad there will or can be no elections. NFAC and State believe that the passage to elections will be accomplished, but not easily. All analysts point out that a breakdown of the cease-fire would carry dangerous implications for the Frontline states as well as for South Africa; witness the havoc now being wrought in Zambia and earlier in Mozambique. We think that one of the dangers for the US in this situation is the expectations of various parties that we will support them. Some of the Frontline, for example, might call on the US to conduct or support a rescue operation for whites if only as an alternative to stall off South African intervention.

With regard to the Namibia/Angola problems, analysts think South Africa will keep up the military pressure on southern Angola. This pressure will add to the indigenous factors which, we think, are keeping the Angolan regime from settling down. In the period immediately ahead, we may see surfacing the tensions which were analyzed at the time of Neto's death, and one specialist believes there could be a "move" by one or other of the MPLA factions which would destabilize the regime's situation.

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EAST AFRICA

Analysts believe President Binaisa's continuing in office is the key to forestalling a growth of Cuban influence in Uganda during the period ahead. Reactions to his cabinet reshuffle, which occurred just prior to our meeting, may be dangerous to him. There are certainly interests which want to see the Cuban presence expand, but the evidence of actual moves in this direction is slim so far.

In Kenya, President Moi won re-election this month but not in a way which strengthens his position much, if at all, and infighting within the post-Kenyatta establishment will continue. Moi has yet to come to terms with representatives of the Kenyatta family, and has relied for advice on his Attorney General, Njonjo, who has proved a poor judge of the situation.

Analysts see no new trends in the Horn, but expect a continuing deterioration in Ethiopia's relations with the US. We suspect that during the current lull in military operations against the Eritreans there may have been further suggestions from the Soviets that Mengistu seek an accommodation with the dissidents, but we doubt that this works with Mengistu. We think he is as determined as the late emperor to maintain the full sovereignty of the Ethiopian estate.

WEST AFRICA

Ghana is running -- barely -- and analysts now worry about food shortages during the pre-harvest period next spring. Other problems -- Nigeria, Liberia, Chad, Zaire -- provoke no fresh comment, but they have not gone away.

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